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ABSTRACT 
Salmon is an anadromous species that during its feeding and spawning migrations is sought after catch for 
commercial and recreational fisheries. The management of salmon fisheries is complicated by the 
combination of mixed and single stock fisheries. Thus, the country of origin has sovereign control over 
harvest of a salmon stock only at the last steps of the gauntlet. This paper addresses the stability of an 
international fisheries agreement on the Baltic salmon. This setting is modeled through a coalition game 
in the partition function form with four asymmetric players. Countries payoffs depend both on 
commercial fishery’s profits and net benefits from recreational harvest. Moreover, the country of origin 
must ensure that each of the salmon stocks achieve or maintain a sustainable size. The economic sub-
model is calibrated using commercial fisheries statistics and existing non-market valuation studies. The 
underlying population dynamics model accounts for 15 salmon stocks and it is used in the actual stock 
assessment. The results indicate that by considering economic aspects of recreational fisheries it is 
possible to stabilize the grand coalition. However, the cooperative strategies of the grand coalition do not 
ensure biologically sound harvesting of all salmon stocks.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The literature on international fisheries agreements (IFAs) shows the Paradox of the Global Commons 
[1], that is, the higher the benefits from cooperation the harder it is to achieve a successful agreement. 
This is due to the existence of positive externalities on coalition formation, which means that free riders 
benefit from others cooperating and aiming at sustainable harvesting. The present paper contributes to this 
literature by studying the impact of non-market values on the stability of international fisheries 
agreements. It has been shown that, in the presence of transfers between members of an IFA, the 
existence of asymmetries between players increases the prospects of cooperationa. For instance, [2] show 
that both partial and full cooperation can be achieved, depending on the number of players, asymmetry 
IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
 2
and efficiency levels. In this paper we model the stability of an IFA on the salmon fisheries in the Baltic 
Sea through a four-player game of coalition formation. Two players (Denmark and Poland) have a 
commercial fleet only, whereas the others (Finland and Sweden) have both commercial fleet and 
substantial recreational fisheries. The recreational benefits are an extra source of asymmetry between 
players and increase the aggregate net benefits from the salmon fishery.   
BIOECONOMIC MODEL 
The game theoretical analysis presented here builds on the model by [3]. We adjust their counterfactual 
analysis by projecting the fishery forward, accounting for the recreational fisheries and updating the 
commercial fleet description with the latest regulations. Moreover, the population dynamic model, which 
accounts for 15 wild salmon stocks, is populated by the parameter values from the latest stock assessment 
[4].  The commercial fleet profits follow the functional forms and estimates adopted from [3]. The four 
players of the game are Poland (PL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI) and Sweden (SE). Poland and Denmark 
harvest salmon in winter using longlines (LL). Finland harvest salmon using longlines and trapnets (TN) 
and the Swedish commercial fleet applies only trapnets. Finland and Sweden have also recreational (RI) 
fisheries that target salmon in their home rivers where the salmon reproduces. Recreational fisheries 
harvest what has escaped from the commercial fisheries. The salmon that escapes recreational fishery 
spawns and dies after it. Due to the migration routes the number of salmon available to each fleet is 
different and thus each fleet has a different effect on the dynamics of each salmon stock (Table I).  
Table I: Fleet structure of each country and the target salmon stocks of each fleet. The stocks with 
recreational fisheries are shown in bold. 
Salmon stock 
PL DK FI SE 
LL LL LL TN RI TN RI 
Tornionjoki x x x x x  x 
Simojoki x x x x x   
Kalixälven x x x x   x 
Råneälven x x x x    
Piteälven x x x x  x  
Åbyälven x x x x  x  
Byskeälven x x x x  x x 
Rickleån x x x x  x  
Sävarån x x x x  x  
Ume/Vindelälven x x x x  x x 
Öreälven x x x x  x  
Lögdeälven x x x x  x  
Ljungan x x x x  x  
Mörrumsån x x x    x 
Emån x x x     
Recreational net benefits 
In modeling the net benefits of the recreational harvest we assume a linear marginal willingness to pay 
(WTP) for recreational harvest and in order to estimate the individual net benefit function, compute the 
integral of the estimated marginal WTP between the current and improved catch levels [5]. These 
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individual net benefits are then aggregated across the approximate angler population to obtain parameters 
of the aggregated net benefit function: NB=kH-vH2, where H, is the salmon catch and k and v functional 
parameters. Based on existing contingent valuation studies we take the WTP estimates for rivers Simojoki 
[6], Tornionjoki (both in the Finnish and the Swedish side) [7], Byskeälven [8], and Ume/Vindelälven [9]. 
Moreover, we assume that the number of anglers and anglers preferences in rivers Kalixälven and in 
Mörrumsån are similar to those in Tornio (Swedish side) and Byskeälven, respectively. Table II presents 
the parameters of the net benefit function for each river. 
Table II: Parameters of the river fisheries net benefit functions. 
 k v 
Byskeälven 11.52 0.0006 
Simojoki 46.54 0.0062 
Torniojoki, Finland 22.51 0.0004 
Torniojoki, Sweden 24.43 0.0027 
Ume/Vindelälven 3.89 0.0022 
COALITION FORMATION GAME 
We use a coalition game in the partition function form to study which kind of international agreements 
between the four countries are possible to form. A partition function assigns a value to each coalition (see 
rows named as ‘Partition’ in the Tables III-V). In our game, a coalition can consist of one to four players 
and its objective is to maximize its economic net benefits from the fishery. The coalition members play 
cooperatively within the coalition. This means that they share the aggregate worth of the coalition. We 
apply the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme (AISS) that allocates to each coalition member its free rider 
payoff plus a share of the coalition surplus (rows named as ‘Valuation’ in the Tables  III-V) [10]. The 
coalition plays non-cooperatively against non-members. That is, the coalition maximizes its benefits 
while knowing that the free riders, singleton(s), are maximizing theirs. As explained earlier, one key 
characteristic of fishery games is positive externalities. Thus, we test if that applies to our game, by 
checking if the free rider payoffs increase when coalitions are formed. For example, we compare the 
payoff of Poland and Denmark in a case where all four countries are singletons (see Table III, coalition 
structure 1) to their payoffs when Finland and Sweden merge (see Table III, coalition structure 2). If the 
non-members payoffs increase when coalitions are formed, considering all possible coalitions, then the 
game exhibits positive externalities. To test the stability of coalitions we use the concepts of internal and 
external stability. A coalition is internally stable (IS) if none of the members finds it optimal to leave the 
coalition. It is externally stable (ES) if none of the non-members finds it optimal to join the coalition. 
Coalition is stable if it is both internally and externally stable.  
RESULTS 
We analyze three scenarios which are explained below. Common to all scenarios is that the strategies 
shown in the Tables III-V are the Nash equilibrium strategies with respect to the reported fishing efforts 
in year 2010. That is, these are constant effort strategies during the simulation period, 2011-2030, which 
correspond to a proportion of the effort level in the base year (2010). The partition and value functions are 
presented in thousands of Euros. A common result to each scenario is that the game exhibit positive 
externalities. 
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Scenario1: Commercial fisheries only 
In the Scenario 1 (S1) the objective function of each country includes only the net present value of the 
commercial fisheries profits in years 2011-2030 and the strategy space of each country includes 
commercial effort. The results show that the total payoffs under non-cooperation and under grand 
coalition are 18.8MEUR and 55.9MEUR, respectively (Table III). However, the grand coalition is not 
stable. The highest total payoff under a stable agreement is 48.1MEUR, which would be a result of an 
agreement between Poland, Denmark and Finland (coalition structure 10, C10). Under this agreement 
Finland would undertake all the harvest of the coalition and share the profits of the commercial fishery 
among all the three coalition members according to the AISS.  
Scenario 2: Recreational net benefits included, but the recreational fisheries are not part of the 
strategy space 
In the Scenario 2 (S2) the objective function of Poland and Denmark includes the net present value of the 
commercial fisheries profits. The objective function of Finland includes the net present value of the LL 
and TN profits and the net benefits from the rivers Simojoki and Tornionjoki recreational fisheries. The 
objective function of Sweden includes the net present value of TN profits and the net benefits from 
recreational fisheries of river Tornionojoki, river Kalixälven, River Byskeälven, River Ume/Vindelälven 
and river Mörrumsån. The strategy space of each country includes only commercial effort. The results 
show that in the non-cooperative game (C1), it would be optimal for Sweden not to harvest at all in the 
commercial fishery and  earn net benefits from the recreational fisheries yielding 31.5MEUR (Table IV). 
The grand coalition (C12) is stable and its optimal strategy, leading to an aggregate payoff of 139MEUR, 
is to stop commercial fishery and keep the river fishery effort constant. 
Scenario 3: Recreational net benefits included, and the recreational fisheries are part of the 
strategy space 
In the Scenario 3 (S3) the objective functions are the same to those in Scenario 2, but the recreational 
fisheries are included now in the strategy space. The Nash equilibrium strategies for the Finnish and 
Swedish recreational fisheries are shown in parenthesis (Table V). The results show that the grand 
coalition is stable and Sweden would be the only harvester. The Nash equilibrium strategies for Swedish 
commercial and recreational fisheries are 3.8 and 1.9 times the level of the base year, respectively. The 
value of grand coalition is 253.6 MEUR. 
Implications for salmon stocks  
Figure 1 illustrates the number of juvenile salmon (smolts) under the different scenarios and coalition 
structures. The present management objective of achieving 75% of the potential smolt production 
capacity is shown by the horizontal dotted line. The results show that non-cooperative solution (C1) 
yields less smolts than stable cooperative solutions under all scenarios (S1-S3). In the long run, rivers 
Torninojoki, Kalixälven and Ume/Vindelälven will achieve the management objective under all the 
shown options. In terms of the smolt production target, the grand coalition under the scenario 2 (S2/C12) 
would be the best. This option would stop the commercial fishery and maintain the recreational fishery 
effort at its present level. However, in economic terms the best agreement would be the grand coalition 
under the scenario 3 (S3/C12).  This outcome would nearly double the recreational fishing effort in the 
Swedish rivers. As a consequence, given the present management objective, this would be too high effort 
for river Mörrumsån.  
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Table III: Results of the Scenario 1. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
1) Commercial fisheries only 
Coalition structure 
 
Poland  Denmark Finland  Sweden Total IS ES 
1 PL,DK,FI,SE 
Strategy 1.8 2.6 3.2 1.2 
18762 yes yes Valuation 5576 495 11594 1098 
Partition 5576 495 11594 1098 
2 (FI,SE) 
Strategy 1.8 2.8 3.4 0 
20965 yes yes Valuation 5808 633 12510 2014 
Partition 5808 633 14524 0 
3 (DK,FI) 
Strategy 1.8 0 3.6 1.4 
23104 yes no Valuation 6581 1758 12857 1909 
Partition 6581 14615 0 1909 
4 (PL,FI) 
Strategy 0 6.6 3.8 2.4 
30520 yes yes Valuation 6893 4745 12911 5971 
Partition 19804 4745 0 5971 
5 (DK,SE) 
Strategy 1.8 0 3.4 1.6 
22993 yes no Valuation 6656 838 14059 1441 
Partition 6656 2278 14059 0 
6 (PL,SE) 
Strategy 0 6.4 4 2.4 
30369 no yes Valuation 5033 4556 20226 555 
Partition 5587 4556 20226 0 
7 (DK,PL) 
Strategy 1.8 0 3.6 1.4 
23104 yes no Valuation 5831 750 14615 1909 
Partition 6581 0 14615 1909 
8 (FI,SE,DK) 
Strategy 2 0 3.6 0 
24014 yes yes Valuation 7182 710 14136 1986 
Partition 7182 16832 0 0 
9 (PL,FI,SE) 
Strategy 0 7.2 3.8 0.4 
33137 no yes Valuation 4274 5732 18693 4438 
Partition 27405 5732 0 0 
10 (PL,DK,FI) 
Strategy 0 0 3.8 4.2 
48097 yes yes Valuation 7419 5584 15453 19640 
Partition 28457 0 0 19640 
11 (PL,DK,SE) 
Strategy 0 0 4.6 3.8 
45501 yes yes Valuation 7204 5104 30735 2457 
Partition 14766 0 30735 0 
12 (PL,DK,FI,SE) 
Strategy 0 0 0.8 4.6 
55887 no yes Valuation 5331 3882 28885 17790 
Partition 55887 0 0 0 
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Table IV: Results of the Scenario 2. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
2) Recreational net benefits included, but recreational fishery is not part of the strategy space 
Coalition structure  Poland  Denmark Finland  Sweden Total IS ES 
1 PL,DK,FI,SE 
Strategy 2 3.8 1.20 0 
64293 yes yes Valuation 6876 1082 24795 31540 
Partition 6876 1082 24795 31540 
2 (FI,SE) 
Strategy 2.2 4 0 0 
69284 yes no Valuation 7605 1160 26887 33632 
Partition 7605 1160 60520 0 
3 (DK,FI) 
Strategy 2.2 0 1.60 0 
69667 yes no Valuation 8839 2456 26169 32203 
Partition 8839 28625 0 32203 
4 (PL,FI) 
Strategy 0 8 2.40 0.6 
80109 yes no Valuation 9687 7076 27605 35742 
Partition 37291 7076 0 35742 
5 (DK,SE) 
Strategy 2.2 0 1.60 0 
69667 no no Valuation 8839 873 28625 31330 
Partition 8839 32203 28625 0 
6 (PL,SE) 
Strategy 0 8 2.40 0.6 
80109 no no Valuation 5539 7076 37291 30203 
Partition 35742 7076 37291 0 
7 (DK,PL) 
Strategy 2.2 0 1.60 0 
69667 yes no Valuation 7316 1522 28625 32203 
Partition 8839 0 28625 32203 
8 (FI,SE,DK) 
Strategy 2.20 0 0 0 
81870 yes no Valuation 10151 4404 31869 35446 
Partition 10151 71719 0 0 
9 (PL,FI,SE) 
Strategy 0 9.6 0 0 
96938 yes no Valuation 9724 9941 39411 37862 
Partition 86997 9941 0 0 
10 (PL,DK,FI) 
Strategy 0 0 3.40 2.40 
98363 yes no Valuation 10674 8911 30461 48317 
Partition 50046 0 0 48317 
11 (PL,DK,SE) 
Strategy 0 0 3.40 2.40 
98363 yes no Valuation 8906 7142 50046 32269 
Partition 48317 0 50046 0 
12 (PL,DK,FI,SE) 
Strategy 0 0 0 0 
139165 yes yes Valuation 15329 15119 55223 53495 
Partition 139165 0 0 0 
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Table V: Results of the Scenario 3. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
3) Recreational fisheries is included in the strategy space 
Coalition structure  Poland  Denmark Finland  Sweden Total IS ES 
1 PL,DK,FI,SE Strategy 1.4 1.8 3 (1.5) 3.4 (1.7) 84296 yes yes 
Valuation 4113 262 20245 59676 
Partition 4113 262 20245 59676 
2 (FI,SE) Strategy 1.8 2.8 0 (0) 3.6 (1.8) 113333 yes no 
Valuation 5812 635 33727 73158 
Partition 5812 635 106886 0 
3 (DK,FI) Strategy 1.6 0 3 (1.5) 3.4 (1.7) 88339 yes no 
Valuation 4976 627 20609 62127 
Partition 4976 21236 0 62127 
4 (PL,FI) Strategy 0 5.4 3.4 (1.7) 3.4 (1.7) 114530 yes no 
Valuation 7906 3277 24038 79310 
Partition 31943 3277 0 79310 
5 (DK,SE) Strategy 1.6 0 3 (1.5) 3.4 (1.7) 88339 yes no 
Valuation 4976 1357 21236 60770 
Partition 4976 62127 21236 0 
6 (PL,SE) Strategy 0 5 3.4 (1.7) 3.6 (1.8) 115817 yes no 
Valuation 13101 2876 31176 68664 
Partition 81764 2876 31176 0 
7 (DK,PL) Strategy 1.6 0 3.4 (1.7) 3.4 (1.7) 88339 yes no 
Valuation 4413 563 21236 62127 
Partition 4976 0 21236 62127 
8 (FI,SE,DK) Strategy 1.8 0 0 3.6 (1.8) 134069 yes no 
Valuation 7441 14845 35446 76337 
Partition 7441 126628 0 0 
9 (PL,FI,SE) Strategy 0 7.6 0 3.6 (1.8) 165617 yes no 
Valuation 20022 6689 45386 93520 
Partition 158928 6689 0 0 
10 (PL,DK,FI) Strategy 0 0 3.8 (1.9) 3.6 (1.8) 155624 yes no 
Valuation 10963 9264 27223 108174 
Partition 47450 0 0 108174 
11 (PL,DK,SE) Strategy 0 0 3.8 (1.9) 3.6 (1.8) 155624 yes no 
Valuation 17708 15608 47450 74858 
Partition 108174 0 47450 0 
12 (PL,DK,FI,SE) Strategy 0 0 0 (0) 3.8 (1.9) 253609 yes yes 
Valuation 28405 27653 68414 129137 
Partition 253609 0 0 0 
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Figure 1. The number of smolts under different scenarios (S) and stable coalition structures (C).The 
horizontal dotted lines shows the 75% of the estimated median smolt production capacity (ICES 2012).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The present paper studies the impact of non-market values on the stability of an international fisheries 
agreement. The preliminary results show that despite the existence of positive externalities accounting 
recreational benefits increases the chances of stable grand coalition. Thus the results support the earlier 
findings in the IFA literature according to which the more asymmetric the players are the more successful 
cooperation, given that a transfer scheme exists. Though the recreational benefits help to achieve stable 
grand coalition and increase the economic benefits from the fishery substantially, the biological 
management objective is not fully met. The result presented here are preliminary and more computational 
power is needed to study how robust the results are for the changes in parameter values. A worthwhile 
extension would be a game setting where recreational and commercial fisheries would be the players.   
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